경제닷컴 GyungJe.com / econ.la
 

An inconvenient fact, however, is that nationalisation of banks, historically, did not tend to lead to further currency weakness.  In fact, very often the financial sector and the currency in question reach a trough just as the government takes steps to address the banking crisis.  Thus, currency weakness tends to precede, not follow nationalisation. 

Popular Thesis on Nationalisation and the Dollar 국영화와 달러관계에 관한 일반적 논제

The notion that nationalisation of banks should lead to currency weakness is popular mainly because it is intuitive.  Since nationalisation of banks is ‘not good news’, and runs counter to the principles of capitalism and the free market, some have the visceral reaction to sell the currency in question. 

Further, as highlighted by Kaminsky and Reinhart (K&R) (see Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999), “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems”, The American Economic Review 89: 3, June), there are many historical examples of ‘twin crises’, whereby banking crises and currency crises occurred simultaneously.  The more memorable examples include Argentina in the early 1980s, Sweden and Norway in the early 1990s, Japan in the late 1990s and Thailand in the late 1990s.  In fact, K&R found that, during 1980-1995, of the 23 banking crises, 18 were accompanied by balance-of-payments crises. 

This link between banking crises and currency crises is genuine, and the usual dynamics are well-summarised by ex-Governor of the Riksbank (Sweden’s central bank) Mr. Bäckström (see What Lessons Can Be Learned from Recent Financial Crises? The Swedish Experience, Kansas City Fed Seminar in Jackson Hole, August 1997):

“Credit market deregulation in 1985 … meant that the monetary conditions became more expansionary.  This coincided, moreover, with rising activity, relatively high inflation expectations, … The freer credit market led to a rapidly growing stock of debt… The credit boom coincided with rising share and real estate prices… The expansion of credit was also associated with increased real economic demand.  Private financial savings dropped by as much as 7 percentage points of GDP and turned negative.  The economy became overheated and inflation accelerated.  Sizeable C/A deficits, accompanied by large outflows of … capital, led to a growing stock of private sector short-term debt in foreign currency”. 

This description applies quite well to the US right now.

Moreover, nationalisation of banks will increase the fiscal burden of the government.  For a country that already has a large fiscal deficit, this is clearly negative for the interest rate outlook.  For one that also has an external deficit, a large public borrowing need, ceteris paribus, should translate into a weaker currency, so the logic goes.  At the same time, the central bank may be tempted to ‘monetise’ the debt, or run a monetary stance that is easier than otherwise – again currency-negative.

The Inconvenient Historical Fact 편치못한 사실

While the arguments above may sound logical and compelling to many, the inconvenient fact is that the historical pattern of how currencies perform before and after nationalisation or bail-outs tells a very different story.  Averaged across five episodes of prominent banking crises, the nominal exchange rate tended to fall before nationalisation, but rise thereafter.  

The historical pattern suggests that financial markets tend to be forward-looking and try to price in the deterioration in the state of the banking system by selling down the currency and financial sector stocks, but the government is usually not compelled to act until conditions deteriorate significantly.  As a result, more often than not, government interventions have coincided with the lows in currency values.  In other words, even though K&R’s observation that currency crises often occur simultaneously with banking crises is correct, there is no strong proof that nationalisation leads to further currency weakness.

Other more visible examples are consistent with this link between banking crises and currency crises. The S&L Crisis and its bail-out spanned a protracted period of time.  The dollar index did continue to fall from 1986 – the beginning of the S&L Crisis – until 1989 or so.   (In 1986, the FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) – the deposit insurance scheme funded by the thrift industry but guaranteed by the government – first reported being insolvent (incidentally, the main reason why 1986 is remembered as the beginning of the S&L Crisis). 

The RTC (Resolution Trust Corporation) was established in 1989, and by 2003, the RTC had ‘resolved’ US$394 billion worth of non-performing assets of US savings and loans.   (The total cost of the clean-up of the US S&L Crisis reached US$153 billion, in ‘current’ terms equivalent to some 2.6% of US GDP in 1991.  This translates to US$375 billion in 2008 dollar terms.)  The dollar index essentially moved sideways in the early 1990s.  The dollar did falter in 1994/95, but that was attributed more to the inflation scare than to the S&L Crisis. 

Similarly, Japan’s government did not explicitly address its banking crisis until 1998-99 and again in 2002-03.  After each episode, USD/JPY actually collapsed toward 100, i.e., JPY strengthened in the ensuing quarters.  Finally, in the case of Thailand, the banking crisis did indeed lead the currency crisis.  But bank bail-outs did not take place until 1998, and USD/THB drifted in the 36-42 range between 1998 and 2000 – significantly below the peak of 56 reached in January 1998.

The case of the US at present is also illustrative.  Between the onset of the credit crisis in August 2007 and the collapse of Bear Stearns on March 16, 2008, EUR/USD rose from 1.35 to 1.58, and lingered around the latter level as the Fed and Treasury assisted other financial institutions in the subsequent months.  Since July, EUR/USD has collapsed from 1.60 to a low of 1.39 last week.  Even with recent dramatic events, there is no evidence that ‘nationalisation = currency weakness’.

현재 미국의 상황도 역시 예증적이다. 서브프라이문제가 표면화되기 시작했던 2007년 8월부터 베어스턴스가 무너졌던 2008년 3월16일사이에 유로대비 달러화는 1.35에서 1.58로 상승했고 그 다음달 연준위가 다른 금융기관들을 도와줄때까지 1.58레벨을 유지했었다. 그 이후, 금년 7월부터 지난주 사이에 환율은 1.6에서 1.39로 급락했다. 그와같은 변화속에서도 국영화가 환율을 약하게 했다는 증거는 없다.

If anything, the dollar has held up remarkably well this week, despite several dollar-negative factors, including:

(i) a higher probability of the Fed cutting the FFR than the ECB reducing the refi rate;

유로은행이 재융자 금리를 낮출확률보다 미국 연준위가 준비금리를 낮출 가능성이 높았는데도

(ii) a diluted Fed balance sheet, from the substitution of US Treasuries for other lower-rated securities; and 

중앙은행이 연방국채를 이자가 낮은 다른 증권으로 대체해서 중앙은행의 대차대조표가 희석되었는데도

(iii) large increases in the future fiscal burden of the US, from the contingent liabilities that are fiscalised. 

금융기관들을 구제하느라 정부가 떠안은 부채부담이 커졌는데도.

사실, 지난주, 달러에 도움이 되는 뉴스는 단한가지였는데 그것은 유가의 하락이었다. 유로대비 달러는 1.45에 근접하고 있다. 하지만 그정도의 움직임은 별의미가  없다. 지금 겪고 있는 미국의 금융스트레스의 강도에 비하면 말이다.

결론적으로 금융위가 환율에 좋지 않다는 사실은 명확하다. 하지만 국영화 그 자체가 화폐가치를 악화시킨다고 할 수는 없다. 대신 국영화가 외환의 약세에 종지부를 찍는 계기라고 볼 수도 있다.

위에 설명하긴 했지만 미국의 예산전망은 진정 염려스럽다. 결국 달러에 영향을 주게 될 것이기 때문이다. 구제안에 의한 예산적 부담은 제쳐놓는다 하더라도 미국의 지출이 지나치게 클 수 있으며 이미 약해진 에퀴티와 부동산 시세로 인해 세금수입 또한 지장을 받을 수 있다.

국회예산국이 발표한 예산보고서에 따르면 미정부의 적자는 2007년, 1610억달러 (GDP 대비 1.2%)에서 2008년, 4070억달러 (2.9%)로 급등했다. 상황이 이렇게 악화된 것은 정부지출의 증가와 세금수입의 감소현상이 병행되기 때문이다. (내년 지출은 2260억달러가 늘어나 3트릴리언, 즉 3조달러에 가까워진다.) 국회예산국은 향후 2년동안 매년 4천억달러의 예산적자가 생길것으로 전망하고 있다.

투자가들은 차기행정부의 지출여부에 촛점을 맞출 것이다. 투자가들에게 역시 중요한 요소는 GDP와 세입의 관계가 매우 민감하다는 사실이다. 지난번 불경기 시기였던 2001-2002년에 불경기가 비교적 짧은 기간에 불과했는데도 정부세입은 무려 GDP 대비 21%에서 16%수준으로 급락했었다. 따라서 향후 미국의 경제회복이 얼마나 건실할 것이냐는 것이 미국의 예산과 깊은 관련성을 가지게 된다. 따라서, 세금수입과 주요지출과 같은 근본적 분야의 추세가 국영화에 들어갈 비용과 마찬가지의 중요성을 가지고 있게된다. 달러의 향방은 미국정부가 지출을 콘트롤하고 경제회복을 얼마나 빨리 현실화시킬 수 있느냐에 달려있다고 본다.

금융사태는 환율에 악재이긴 하지만 국영화 그 자체가 환율에 더 나쁜 영향을 주지 않는다. 실질적으로 국영화는 달러의 바닥세를 찾아 주는 경우가 잦다. 몰간스탠리에서는 현재의 에피소드가 달러의 바닥세를 찾게 될 계기가 되줄것으로 기대한다. 중기적으로 봤을 때, 달러의 의험은 국영화가 아니라 정부지출과 세금수입에 남겨져 있다.