
Nobel Prize Economist: Joseph
Stiglitz
How to prevent the next Wall
Street crisis
By Joseph
Stiglitz
Special to CNN
|
Editor's note:
Joseph E. Stiglitz, professor at Columbia University, was
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 for his work
on the economics of information and was on the climate
change panel that shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008.
Stiglitz, a
supporter of Barack Obama, was a member and later chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton
administration before joining the World Bank as chief
economist and senior vice president. He is the co-author
with Linda Bilmes of the "Three
Trillion Dollar War: The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict."
|
2008.09.17
Interview with CNN -- Many seem taken aback by the depth and
severity of the current financial turmoil. I was among several
economists who saw it coming and warned about the risks.
There is ample
blame to be shared; but the purpose of parsing out blame is to
figure out how to make a recurrence less likely.
President Bush
famously said, a little while ago, that the problem is simple:
Too many houses were built. Yes, but the answer is too
simplistic: Why did that happen?
One can say the
Fed failed twice, both as a regulator and in the conduct of
monetary policy. Its flood of liquidity (money made available
to borrow at low interest rates) and lax regulations led to a
housing bubble. When the bubble broke, the excessively
leveraged loans made on the basis of overvalued assets went
sour.
For all the
new-fangled financial instruments, this was just another one
of those
financial crises based on excess leverage, or borrowing,
and a pyramid scheme.
The new
"innovations" simply hid the extent of systemic leverage and
made the risks less transparent; it is these innovations that
have made this collapse so much more dramatic than earlier
financial crises. But one needs to push further: Why did the
Fed fail?
First, key
regulators like Alan Greenspan didn't really believe in
regulation; when the excesses of the financial system were
noted, they called for self-regulation -- an oxymoron.
Second, the
macro-economy was in bad shape with the collapse of the tech
bubble. The tax cut of 2001 was not designed to stimulate the
economy but to give a largesse to the wealthy -- the group
that had been doing so well over the last quarter-century.
The
coup d'grace was the Iraq War, which contributed to soaring
oil prices. Money that used to be spent on American goods now
got diverted abroad. The Fed took seriously its responsibility
to keep the economy going.
It did this by
replacing the tech bubble with a new bubble, a housing bubble.
Household savings plummeted to zero, to the lowest level since
the Great Depression. It managed to sustain the economy, but
the way it did it was shortsighted: America was living on
borrowed money and borrowed time.
Finally, at the
center of blame must be the financial institutions themselves.
They -- and even more their executives -- had incentives that
were not well aligned with the needs of our economy and our
society.
They were amply
rewarded, presumably for managing risk and allocating capital,
which was supposed to improve the efficiency of the economy so
much that it justified their generous compensation. But they
misallocated capital; they mismanaged risk -- they created
risk.
They did what
their incentive structures were designed to do: focusing on
short-term profits and encouraging excessive risk-taking.
This is not the
first crisis in our financial system, not the first time that
those who believe in free and unregulated markets have come
running to the government for bail-outs. There is a pattern
here, one that suggests deep systemic problems -- and a
variety of solutions:
-
We need first
to correct incentives for executives, reducing the scope for
conflicts of interest and improving shareholder information
about dilution in share value as a result of stock options.
We should mitigate the incentives for excessive risk-taking
and the short-term focus that has so long prevailed, for
instance, by requiring bonuses to be paid on the basis of,
say, five-year returns, rather than annual returns.
-
Secondly, we
need to create a financial product safety commission, to
make sure that products bought and sold by banks, pension
funds, etc. are safe for "human consumption." Consenting
adults should be given great freedom to do whatever they
want, but that does not mean they should gamble with other
people's money. Some may worry that this may stifle
innovation. But that may be a good thing considering the
kind of innovation we had -- attempting to subvert
accounting and regulations. What we need is more innovation
addressing the needs of ordinary Americans, so they can stay
in their homes when economic conditions change.
-
We need to
create a financial systems stability commission to take an
overview of the entire financial system, recognizing the
interrelations among the various parts, and to prevent the
excessive systemic leveraging that we have just experienced.
-
We need to
impose other regulations to improve the safety and soundness
of our financial system, such as "speed bumps" to limit
borrowing. Historically, rapid expansion of lending has been
responsible for a large fraction of crises and this crisis
is no exception.
-
We need
better consumer protection laws, including laws that prevent
predatory lending.
-
We need
better competition laws. The financial institutions have
been able to prey on consumers through credit cards partly
because of the absence of competition. But even more
importantly, we should not be in situations where a firm is
"too big to fail." If it is that big, it should be broken
up.
These reforms
will not guarantee that we will not have another crisis. The
ingenuity of those in the financial markets is impressive.
Eventually, they will figure out how to circumvent whatever
regulations are imposed. But these reforms will make another
crisis of this kind less likely, and, should it occur, make it
less severe than it otherwise would be.