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S&P 500 Index (5 Days Chart)
2011.04.18
2011.04.18
Overview (°³¿ä)
We have affirmed our 'AAA/A-1+' sovereign credit rating on the
United States of America.
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The economy of the U.S. is flexible and highly diversified,
the country's effective monetary policies have supported
output growth while containing inflationary pressures, and a
consistent global preference for the U.S. dollar over all
other currencies gives the country unique external
liquidity.
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Because the U.S. has, relative to its 'AAA' peers, what we
consider to be very large budget deficits and rising
government indebtedness and the path to addressing these is
not clear to us, we have revised our outlook on the
long-term rating to negative from stable.
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We believe there is a material risk that U.S. policymakers
might not reach an agreement on how to address medium- and
long-term budgetary challenges by 2013; if an agreement is
not reached and meaningful implementation does not begin by
then, this would in our view render the U.S. fiscal profile
meaningfully weaker than that of peer 'AAA' sovereigns.
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Rating Action (Æò°¡
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On April 18, 2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed
its 'AAA' long-term and 'A-1+' short-term sovereign credit
ratings on the United States of America and revised its outlook
on the long-term rating to negative from stable.
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Rationale (ÀÌÀ¯)
Our ratings on the U.S. rest on its high-income, highly
diversified, and flexible economy, backed by a strong track
record of prudent and credible monetary policy. The ratings also
reflect our view of the unique advantages stemming from the
dollar's preeminent place among world currencies. Although we
believe these strengths currently outweigh what we consider to
be the
U.S.'s meaningful economic and fiscal risks and large external
debtor position, we now believe that they might not fully offset
the credit risks over the next two years at the 'AAA' level.
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The U.S. is among the most flexible high-income nations, with
both adaptable labor markets and a long track record of openness
to capital flows. In addition, its public sector uses a smaller
share of national income than those of most 'AAA' rated
countries--including its closest peers, the U.K., France,
Germany, and Canada (all AAA/Stable/A-1+)--which implies greater
revenue flexibility.
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Furthermore, the U.S. dollar is the world's most used currency,
which provides the U.S. with unique external flexibility; the
vast majority of U.S. trade flows and external liabilities are
denominated in its own dollars. Recent depreciation of the
currency has not materially affected this position, and we do
not expect this to change in the medium term (see "Après Le
Déluge, The U.S. Dollar Remains The Key International Currency,"
March 10, 2010, RatingsDirect).
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Despite these exceptional strengths, we note the U.S.'s fiscal
profile has deteriorated steadily during the past decade and, in
our view, has worsened further as a result of the recent
financial crisis and ensuing recession. Moreover, more than two
years after the beginning of the recent crisis, U.S.
policymakers have still not agreed on a strategy to reverse
recent fiscal deterioration or address longer-term fiscal
pressures.
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In 2003-2008, the U.S.'s general (total) government deficit
fluctuated between 2% and 5% of GDP. Already noticeably larger
than that of most 'AAA' rated sovereigns, it ballooned to more
than 11% in 2009 and has yet to recover.
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On April 13, President Barack Obama laid out his
Administration's medium-term fiscal consolidation plan, aimed at
reducing the cumulative unified federal deficit by US$4 trillion
in 12 years or less. A key component of the Administration's
strategy is to work with Congressional leaders over the next two
months to develop a commonly agreed upon program to reach this
target. The President's proposals envision reducing the deficit
via both spending cuts and revenue increases, and the adoption
of a "debt failsafe" legislative mechanism that would trigger an
across-the-board spending reduction if, by 2014, budget
projections show that federal debt to GDP has not yet stabilized
and is not expected to decline in the second half of the current
decade.
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The Obama Administration's proposed spending cuts include
reducing non-security discretionary spending to levels similar
to those proposed by the Fiscal Commission in December 2010,
holding growth in base security (excluding war expenditure)
spending below inflation, and further cost-control measures
related to health care programs. Revenue would be increased via
both tax reform and allowing the 2001 and 2003 income and estate
tax cuts to expire in 2012 as currently scheduled--though only
for high-income households. We note that the President advocated
the latter proposal last year before agreeing with Republicans
to extend the cuts beyond their previously scheduled 2011
expiration. The compromise agreed upon in December likely
provides short-term support for the economic recovery, but we
believe it also weakens the U.S.'s fiscal outlook and, in our
view, reduces the likelihood that Congress will allow these tax
cuts to expire in the near future. We also note that previously
enacted legislative mechanisms meant to enforce budgetary
discipline on future Congresses have not always succeeded.
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Key
members in the U.S. House of Representatives have also advocated
fiscal tightening of a similar magnitude, US$4.4 trillion,
during the coming 10 years, but via different methods. House
Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan's plan seeks to balance the
federal budget by 2040, in part by cutting non-defense spending.
The plan also includes significantly reducing the scope of
Medicare and Medicaid, while bringing top individual and
corporate tax rates lower than those under the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts.
We view President Obama's and Congressman Ryan's proposals as
the starting point of a process aimed at broader engagement,
which could result in substantial and lasting U.S. government
fiscal consolidation. That said, we see the path to agreement as
challenging because the gap between the parties remains wide. We
believe there is a significant risk that Congressional
negotiations could result in no agreement on a medium-term
fiscal strategy until after the fall 2012 Congressional and
Presidential elections. If so, the first budget proposal that
could include related measures would be Budget 2014 (for the
fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 2013), and we believe a delay
beyond that time is possible.
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and
revenue measures the Congress and the Administration might
conclude are appropriate. But for any plan to be credible, we
believe that it would need to secure support from a
cross-section of leaders in both political parties.
If U.S. policymakers do agree on a fiscal consolidation
strategy, we believe the experience of other countries
highlights that implementation could take time. It could also
generate significant political controversy, not just within
Congress or between Congress and the Administration, but
throughout the country. We therefore think that, assuming an
agreement between Congress and the President, there is a
reasonable chance that it would still take a number of years
before the government reaches a fiscal position that stabilizes
its debt burden. In addition, even if such measures are
eventually put in place, the initiating policymakers or
subsequently elected ones could decide to at least partially
reverse fiscal consolidation.
In our baseline macroeconomic scenario of near 3% annual real
growth, we expect the general government deficit to decline
gradually but remain slightly higher than 6% of GDP in 2013. As
a result, net general government debt would reach 84% of GDP by
2013. In our macroeconomic forecast's optimistic scenario
(assuming near 4% annual real growth), the fiscal deficit would
fall to 4.6% of GDP by 2013, but the U.S.'s net general
government debt would still rise to almost 80% of GDP by 2013.
In our pessimistic scenario (a mild, one-year double-dip
recession in 2012), the deficit would be 9.1%, while net debt
would surpass 90% by 2013. Even in our optimistic scenario, we
believe the U.S.'s fiscal profile would be less robust than
those of other 'AAA' rated sovereigns by 2013. (For all of the
assumptions underpinning our three forecast scenarios, see "U.S.
Risks To The Forecast: Oil We Have to Fear Is¡¦," March 15, 2011,
RatingsDirect.
Additional fiscal risks we see for the U.S. include the
potential for further extraordinary official assistance to large
players in the U.S. financial or other sectors, along with
outlays related to various federal credit programs. We estimate
that it could cost the U.S. government as much as 3.5% of GDP to
appropriately capitalize and relaunch Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, two financial institutions now under federal control, in
addition to the 1% of GDP already invested (see "U.S. Government
Cost To Resolve And Relaunch Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac Could
Approach $700 Billion," Nov. 4, 2010, RatingsDirect). The
potential for losses on federal direct and guaranteed loans
(such as student loans) is another material fiscal risk, in our
view. Most importantly, we believe the risks from the U.S.
financial sector are higher than we considered them to be before
2008, as our downward revisions of our Banking Industry Country
Risk Assessment (BICRA) on the U.S. to Group 3 from Group 2 in
December 2009 and to Group 2 from Group 1 in December 2008
reflect (see "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments," March
8, 2011, and "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: United
States of America," Feb. 1, 2010, both on RatingsDirect). In
line with these views, we now estimate the maximum aggregate,
up-front fiscal cost to the U.S. government of resolving
potential financial sector asset impairment in a stress scenario
at 34% of GDP compared with our estimate of 26% in 2007.
Beyond the short- and medium-term fiscal challenges, we view the
U.S.'s unfunded entitlement programs (such as Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid) to be the main source of long-term
fiscal pressure. These entitlements already account for almost
half of federal spending (an estimated 42% in fiscal-year 2011),
and we project that percentage to continue increasing as long as
these entitlement programs remain as they currently exist (see
"Global Aging 2010: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Cost A Lot More
Green," Oct. 25, 2010, RatingsDirect). In addition, the U.S.'s
net external debt level (as we narrowly define it), approaching
300% of current account receipts in 2011, demonstrates a high
reliance on foreign financing. The U.S.'s external indebtedness
by this measure is one of the highest of all the sovereigns we
rate.
While thus far U.S. policymakers have been unable to agree on a
fiscal consolidation strategy, the U.S.'s closest 'AAA' rated
peers have already begun implementing theirs. The U.K., for
example, suffered a recession almost twice as severe as that in
the U.S. (U.K. GDP declined 4.9% in real terms in 2009, while
the U.S.'s dropped 2.6%). In addition, the U.K.'s net general
government indebtedness has risen in tandem with that of the
U.S. since 2007. In June 2010, the U.K. began to implement a
fiscal consolidation plan that we believe credibly sets the
country's general government deficit on a medium-term downward
path, retreating below 5% of GDP by 2013.
We also expect that by 2013, France's austerity program, which
it is already implementing, will reduce that country's deficit,
which never rose to the levels of the U.S. or U.K. during the
recent recession, to slightly below the U.K. deficit. Germany,
which suffered a recession of similar magnitude to that in the
U.K. (but has enjoyed a much stronger recovery), enacted a
constitutional limit on fiscal deficits in 2009 and we believe
its general government deficit was already at 3% of GDP last
year and will likely decrease further. Meanwhile, Canada, the
only sovereign of the peer group to suffer no major financial
institution failures requiring direct government assistance
during the crisis, enjoys by far the lowest net general
government debt of the five peers (we estimate it at 34% of GDP
this year), largely because of an unbroken string of
balanced-or-better general government budgetary outturns from
1997 through 2008. Canada's general government deficit never
exceeded 4% of GDP during the recent recession, and we believe
it will likely return to less than 0.5% of GDP by 2013.
Outlook (Àü¸Á)
The negative outlook on our rating on the U.S. sovereign signals
that we believe there is at least a one-in-three likelihood that
we could lower our long-term rating on the U.S. within two
years. The outlook reflects our view of the increased risk that
the political negotiations over when and how to address both the
medium- and long-term fiscal challenges will persist until at
least after national elections in 2012.
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Some compromise that achieves agreement on a comprehensive
budgetary consolidation program--containing deficit reduction
measures in amounts near those recently proposed, and combined
with meaningful steps toward implementation by 2013--is our
baseline assumption and could lead us to revise the outlook back
to stable. Alternatively, the lack of such an agreement or a
significant further fiscal deterioration for any reason could
lead us to lower the rating.
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