Paper Gold vs. the Dollar?
vs.
(:
Ⱥ -
Russia ȭ ´ٸ)
July 7, 2010
Interview by: Chris Whalen
with James Rickards
http://us1.institutionalriskanalytics.com/pub/iramain.asp
|
ؼ:
The Institutional Risk Analytics (IRA)ũ
Ϸ
ӽ ī
ͺ信 ̱ ȯ ȭ â
ȭ ؿ ɼ մϴ.
|
(Chris Whalen) The
IRA: Thank you for taking the time
to talk with us. We previewed this
interview yesterday on CNBC in a
discussion with Ian Bremmer
of Eurasia Group and Nouriel
Roubini. We wanted to talk to
you today about the global economy
and the dollar. You may have seen
our reference last week ("Country
Risk: The World According to Robert
Rubin (Updated)", June 29, 2010) to
the new borrowing rights that the
International Monetary Fund has
created at the behest of the
inflationist tendency in the White
House.
IRA:
ּż մϴ.
þ ̾ 극Ӿ
Բ
CNBC (
TV
ä)
´㿡 ͺ
۷ι ̾߱⸦ ̸ ־ϴ.
Rickards: My day job
is working with funds and banks, but
by night I focus on the geopolitical
implications of the global
macroeconomic outlook. The
intersection of finance and
geopolitics is a place that far too
few analysts feel comfortable. The
people who can speak to a three-star
general about asymmetrical warfare
and then turn around and speak to a
swap counterparty about collateral
issues are few and far between. At
Omnis we are finding more and more
call for just this type of
expertise. When credit default swaps
are taking down Greece and you
realize that Greece is a NATO ally,
the reason for interest in
financials by the security community
is obvious.
ī:
Ϸ ϰ ,
ݵ ϰ 㿡 ۷ι Žð
ִ Ǵ 迡 մϴ.
ϴ θ ϴ м
ʽϴ.
屺 Ī ؼ ϰ,
Ƽ ī Ƽ 㺸 ڻ꿡 ̽
ִ ʴٴ .
ȴϽ
()
ã ð üմϴ.
ũ Ʈ ,
ÿ ͱ ƾ մϴ.
迡 ϴ ٷ .
The IRA: As we have
said before, we note an increased
interest in financial markets by
members of the security community.
If you go through the contract
awards for SEC and the bank
regulatory agencies you will see
some names that are most often seen
in the defense community.
IRA:
ߴ 忡
Ű ֽϴ.
ǰ̳ న ûڵ
캸 ߿ ()迡
ִ ̸ Դϴ.
Rickards: There are
actually two flows at the moment.
The capital markets have a voracious
appetite for geopolitical insights
involving, for example, Iran and
Israel with obvious implications for
oil prices. At the same time the
national security community needs to
understand capital markets because
the security of nations is being
undermined by fiscal policies and
credit default swaps as we've seen
in Greece. My firm is comfortable
processing information in both
directions; helping the national
security community understand
markets and helping capital markets
participants understand geopolitics.
ī:
ǻ ֹ 帧 ֽϴ.
ں ȸ µ ռ Ը ֽϴ.
̶ ̽ ˷ ū ְ
.
ÿ Ȱ ں忡 ϴ.
ֳĸ 츦 ˼ ֵ å ũ
Ʈ ҿ ȿ ֱ .
The IRA: Using
techniques tuned to predict security
events can also help with screening
incoming tips for a regulatory
hotline, for example. But many of
the "issues" facing regulators in
better attacking problems in the
financial markets involve process
issues, not decision about the
desired result. When our political
class becomes so dissolute that
their behavior threatens national
security, it raises some issues that
Americans are not used to dealing
with.
Rickards: Agreed. To
give you a sense of how much
interest there is in financial
matters in the national security
community, I recently headed a panel
at a program sponsored by the Johns
Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory,
one of the premier private research
centers in the U.S. for developing
everything from new weapons to
nuclear strategy. The topic of my
paper was a hypothetical press
release issued by the Russian
central bank announcing the creation
of a new, gold-back currency. In the
hypothetical, the Russians also
announce that exports of energy and
other natural resources will have to
be made in this new "gold ruble."
The Russians would become a market
maker in gold and effectively
control the marginal price of gold
transactions. This is basically a
plan for taking down the dollar.
մϴ.
Ȱ谡 迡 ⸦ ϳ .
ֱٿ Ų 豹 ְ
ֽϴ.
װ Ź ߺ ̸ 缳
.
þ ߾ ȯ ȭ
Ѵٴ ǥǴ óϴ.
ó ϴ ڿ
ȭ Ѵٴ åǥ ֽϴ.
þȵ 带 Ŀ Ǹ ŷ ݺȭ
ȿ ϰ ˴ϴ.
̱ ʶ߸ .
The IRA: It is an
entirely plausible scenario. The
Russians could establish a "gold"
price for oil and then the paper
currencies would trade at a
discount. Thanks to the lack of
leadership in Washington by either
party, the U.S. is quite vulnerable
to the creation of a gold-backed or
commodity-backed currency. This
August is the 40th anniversary of
the decision in 1971 by President
Richard Nixon, aided and abetted by
a Treasury official named Paul
Volcker and Fed Chairman Arthur
Burns, to break the link between the
dollar and gold. The excuse then was
justified based on the short-term
need for growth and inflation. As a
senior Fed official told us, look at
the period since the 1990s. Count
how many quarters we have not had
either fiscal stimulus or
accommodative interest rates by the
Fed to maintain the illusion of
growth.
ó.
þȵ ϰ īƮ ŷ
ǰڱ.
̱ ȭ ְھ.
8
н ݰ ἱ ߶
40ֳ
Ǵ Դϴ.
ڵ 繫 Ŀ ̾.
̱ ÷̼ ܱ
ʿ伺̾ϴ.
ѻ 鿡 ߵ,
1990
ݱ ξ̳ ȭȭå бⰡ ̳
־ .
̶ ȯ ϱ ؼ Դϴ.
Rickards: Precisely.
But what is interesting is that a
couple of days ago, we saw the
arrest of this seemingly hapless
Russian spy gang. These people were
a relic of the Cold War, running
around Montclair, New Jersey, and
meeting in New York coffee shops.
But the one little tidbit that came
out of the complaint filed by
prosecutors is that the one subject
that got a lot of reaction from
Moscow was gold. Whatever these
people were collecting for the
Russians, the information about gold
was of great interest. Often times
in intelligence you care less about
what the field agents are collecting
than who is asking and why they are
asking. The paper I did is getting
written up all over the web. But the
fact that the information on gold
touched a nerve in Moscow confirms
my view about their intentions
toward the dollar.
Ȯ ƮԴϴ.
̷ο ̻ 츮 ҿ þ
üǾ ־ϴ.
Ұմϴ.
ƮŬ,
,
ĿǼ ƴٴϴ
߿ Ѱ ħ ߴ
ũٰ 忡 뿡 ؼ ū
ٴ Դϴ.
Ϸ ߴ 忡
߾ ϴ.
迡 ̵ ߴ ٵ
״ ū ΰ .
ȹ Ǿϴ.
忡 ؼ ũٰ Ű μٴ
̱ ؼ ִ ǵ ǽ Դ ظ
Ȯν Դϴ.
The IRA: Well it is
so obvious. We interviewed David
Kotok of Cumberland Advisers
last month, some of which will
appear in Chris Whalen's upcoming
book. Kotok just published a bullish
book on Europe, Invest in Europe
Now, and Kotok is even more
bullish today. As he puts it, the
Greeks gave the Germans a 20%
currency devaluation. Kotok thinks
that the crisis in Europe will
eventually force the EU to fully
integrate. But we speak to insiders
with precisely the opposite view,
who say the Europeans do not have a
grip on the financial problems. Does
the EU emerge stronger from the
crisis?
翬 ƴϰڽϱ?
Ĺ ̺ ͺ
ֽϴ.
ͺ å Դϴ.
ؼ å ߰ ̴ϴ.
å ̸
϶Դϴ.
״ Դϴ.
ǥ ,
ε Ͽ
20%
ȭϸ ־ Դϴ.
̹ Ⱑ
EU
սŰ ̶ մϴ.
ӻ ƴ ȭ ʹ ݴ
Ȳ̶ մϴ.
¿ ϴٰ
ϴµ.
EU
̹ ⸦ ?
Rickards: I agree
with the view that says the EU gets
stronger. I keep reminding people
that the European Central Bank and
the 16 members of the monetary
system have over 10,000 tons of
gold. They have more gold than the
U.S. Treasury. We have just over
8,100 tons ourselves. If the EU were
to go to even a partial reserve
coverage with gold, say 20% backing,
it would put Europe at an enormous
advantage. They have enough gold
today to set a target and make a
two-way market in gold. I think that
the first major currency bloc that
goes to gold will dominate the
financial world because it will
become the only currency anybody
will want. The first mover will
force the other nations to follow.
EU
̶ մϴ.
ߵ,
EU
߾ ȭ
16
1
Ѵ 带 ϰ ֽϴ.
̱ 繫κ 带 ֽϴ.
츮
8õ
ְŵ.
EU
κγ ȭ ٸ
(
20%
)
ö ˴ϴ.
ó ϰ ִ Ÿ ִ
ÿ ֹ ݽ ֽϴ.
ȭ ִ ʿ
ϰ Դϴ.
ֳĸ 常 ϴ ȭ ̱ Դϴ.
Żȯϴ Ÿ Ǿ ֽϴ.
The IRA: This is the
idiocy of the U.S. position. We have
set ourselves up as an easy target
for our enemies. It is astounding
that the Chinese have not been more
aggressive in selling dollars. Maybe
they are going to manage our
downfall gently.
̱ ó ô ٺ.
츮 鿡 ǥ Ǿ.
߱ ǿ Ű ʰ ִ° ϴ.
¼ 츮 Ʋϰ
.
Rickards: I think the
Chinese probably are doing it
gently. The Japanese and Chinese are
both influenced by Zen which, in
Western jargon, is really about
optionality. The whole idea of Zen
is to avoid black and white
decisions and instead create a range
of options and possible outcomes.
Instead of committing yourself to a
binary decision, you create a fan of
probabilities and look for your
openings. So in that sense, if you
think of it in options space, the
Chinese are probably content to play
the American paper game with the
dollar, but all the while preparing
for the day when the dollar
collapses completely.
Ƹ ߱ Ʋϰ Ϸ
ڽϴ.
Ϻ ߱
()
Ծϴ.
ϸ װ /Ƕ
.
̺й ƴ϶ ɼǰ
þ ϴ Դϴ.
̱ ÷ϸ鼭 Ϻϰ
ϴ.
The IRA: Americans
are convinced that it cannot happen
here, the greatest nation on earth.
Reminds us of France after WWI. Same
degree of self-delusion. And no
reaction by U.S. officials to the
Chinese and Russia gold purchases?
ϰ
ִ ̱ε ó ʽϴ.
1
ȸ ô.
.
߱ þư 带 ִ Ϳ ̱
?
Rickards: The
Russians do not hide their purchases
of gold. The incremental growth of
Russian gold reserves is visible in
their monthly statistics. The
Chinese have been more surreptitious
in their purchases but even they
have announced the reserves doubled
in recent years. The way that both
of these nations add to gold without
impacting the global price is that
they are buying from internal,
captive producers. And they pay
below market prices because even
paying $800 per ounce still gives
their miners a tremendous profit.
Between 2004 and 2008, China almost
doubled the gold stocks of Peoples
Bank of China, but they bought it
through other state agencies to keep
it off their books.
þȵ 带 ϰ
н ʽϴ.
Ͽ
ֽϴ.
߱ нϴ.
߱ ֱ ̿ ι þٰ
ǥ߽ϴ.
ü 鼭 ִ
̿ϱ Դϴ.
尡 ϰ ֽϴ.
½
800
´ ϴ 鿡Դ ū ˴ϴ.
2004 -2008
̿ ߱ ι谡 ÷ȴµ Ÿ
ø ؼ ν ο ԽŰ ʴ
ֽϴ.
The IRA: So there is
the pretense of coordination among
the G-20, but meanwhile China is
preparing to operate in a hard
currency world. Is this a good way
to describe your view?
߱
G-20
̰ ִ δ
ȭ ϰ ִٴ ?
½ϱ?
Rickards: We have
been operating in a dollar world for
decades. Notwithstanding the demise
of Bretton Woods in 1971, it's still
a dollar system. All of the world's
expectations, all of its productive
capacity, all of its allocations of
capital are built around that
system. When the caretakers of that
system allow weeds in the garden and
for the system to disintegrate and
fall apart, which is what I see
happening in the U.S., the immediate
reaction is first confusion, then
panic and then self help. This gets
to the heart of the national
security implications of the
financial crisis. Initially other
nations were content to wait for the
U.S. response, but now I see nations
like China, Russia and Germany
increasingly willing to act on their
own.
츰 ӿ ʳ
ƿԽϴ.
1971
극ư Ŀ 츰 Ͽ ֽϴ.
ġ,
뷮,
ںй谡 ȿ ֽϴ.
ʸ ׳ ΰ,
رϵ ε ̱
ǥȭǰ ִ Դϴ.
ù ȥ̾,
д,
ڱ ڵ .
װ ٷ Ⱑ ̽ Դϴ.
ʱ Ÿ ̱ ó Ѻ,
߱ þ,
ڱå ֽϴ.
The IRA: The euro was
up to 25% of global flows prior to
the crisis. You could price oil in
euros. It's a big enough currency to
be the unit of account and means of
exchange for global energy.
,
δ ȭ
25%
߽ϴ.
η ŷ ־.
۷ι ڿ ŷ å ŭ
ȭϴ.
Rickards: The trend
in the amount of global trade priced
in dollars has been going down for
decades. This brings us today to the
key question, which is what is the
U.S. plan? Fed Chairman Bernanke
wakes up every morning and tries to
trash the dollar with quantitative
easing, zero interest rates and
swaps lines with the central banks.
But it has not been working. The Fed
has never taken it to the next step
and asked what happens when
quantitative easing does not work.
ʳ ,
پ ϴ.
Ѱ ߿ ϴ.
̱
ȹ ̳?
.
Ű ħ ħ뿡 Ͼ
Quantitative Easing (äǸ
ȭå),
αݸ,
߾ Ҷε ø մϴ.
QE
۵ ʰ ־.
Ű ó
QE
ϰ ܰ迡 ؼ ʽϴ.
The IRA: The folks at
the Fed have been talking about it.
Read Vince Reinhart's
FOMC briefing materials from October
2003.
We also got some great stuff with
Kotok on the 2001-2003 period that
will appear in the book. But to your
point, the problem since 2001 has
been deflation. As we said above,
since the 1990s the U.S. economy has
been on one form of stimulus or
another. The same political class
who want to pretend that the economy
is growing will never embrace gold
because it implies a deceleration of
the economy that could cut points
off of GDP around the world. And as
we have said before, the Fed's low
rate policy is driving deflation,
both by coloring perceptions and
slowly destroying the income from
fixed income assets.
̿ ִ
.
Ʈ
FOMC
긮ΰ
2001-2003
ڷῡ Ǿ ֽϴ.
ī ư2001
ķ ¥ ÷̼̾ϴ.
ߵ
1990
̱ ξåϿ ־ϴ.
ȭ ư ϰ ;ϴ
ġĴ ó
GDP
ġ ̶ ϰ ֽϴ.
ݸ å ÷̼ ̰
ֽϴ.
帮 ڻ ıŰ鼭
Դϴ.
Rickards: We are
taught that Money Supply * Velocity
= Real GDP * Inflation. The equation
is what it is. But what the Fed
always assumed was that velocity
would remain constant and use the
other variables for policy. Then the
only question was what the inflation
component would be. But velocity is
not constant. And if velocity
declines faster than the Fed can
print money, then GDP will decline
with it. Deflation is the dominant
trend in my view but we could have a
burst of hyperinflation on the path
to deflation if the Fed is unwilling
to accept the inevitable
consequences of the easy money and
asset price bubbles of 1998 to 2007.
츮
[ȭ(M)
x
ȭӵ(V)
=
GDP
x
()]̶
ݾƿ.
״ Դϴ.
ϰ ִ ӵ ¿
ٸ ҵ鸸 Ѵٴ .
ٸ ٽ ÷̼ Ҵ Ĵ ̴ϴ.
ӵ ġ ƴ.
ӵ ӵ Ѵٸ
GDP
ϰ.
طδ ÷̼ ϴ.
÷̼ ߰ ÷̼ ־
–
Ű
QE
ݸ
1998-2007
̾ٴ ʴ´ٸ Դϴ.
The IRA: The issue of
velocity makes you wonder what part
of the Depression many economists
studied. Everyone in Washington is
so surprised to see the Europeans
retrenching instead of spending more
on stimulus. Being conservative in
times of economic stress is the
normal human reaction, a reaction
that is not transcended by Keynesian
economics, especially when the
markets will not allow you to
borrow. This is no longer about
ideology but reflects the weight of
accumulated debt and the public
perception of future income vs.
today's debt load.
ȭӵ ϴٺ
Ȳ κ ־ ǹ
ϴ.
ε ̰ ִ Ϳ ô
ǥ ֽϴ.
־϶ Ϸ ΰ
ֽϴ.
Ư ִ .
Ű ̴ϴ.
м ̽ ƴ϶ ̰
Կ ũ ̷ҵ濡 ġ 踦
ε ϰ ִİ Դϴ.
Rickards: I very
quickly reach the point where this
is no longer about left or right,
it's about the mathematics of
compounding and the dynamics of
complex systems. The Europeans get
that point. We went from Dubai to
Greece very quickly. The contagion
effect was visible. You could not
push Greece off the bus without
unwinding the entire EU and the
Europeans do not want to see that
happen. You start with the Thirty
Years War and work your way through
Napolean, WWI and WWII. You have
centuries of war and destruction in
Europe. The Europeans arrived in the
middle of the 20th Century and
decided that they needed to come
together to avoid another war. The
monetary side has been a success,
but political and diplomatic
integration not so much to date. But
the EU is the shinning success for
Europe after centuries of war and
holocaust and annihilation. They are
not going to let it go.
ij ijĸ
ƴ϶ .
ϼа ̳ ؾ Դϴ.
ε .
ι̿ ӵ dzʰŵ.
̾ϴ.
EU
ü ε ϱ ٱ
.
Ҿ ° 翬Ǵ ; ʰ
ֽϴ.
30
ؼ ġ,
1,
2
ݽϱ?
츰 ı ýϴ.
20
߹ݿ ٽô ڰ ߽ϴ.
,
ȭ ġ,
ܱ ȭտ ֽϴ.
л,
ĸ ް Ŀ ϸ
EU
̾ϴ.
EU
Դϴ.
The IRA: So here is
the question: if the U.S. has its
head buried in the sand, who is the
leader of the global currency system
going forward?
̴̰ϴ.
̱ Ӹ ھƹٸ ȭ
Ǵ ̴ϱ?
Rickards: Well, the
leader of the process is not clear.
This gets back to a whole series of
very revealing interviews given by
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
in the late 1990s that we have to
dig out. He embraces something that
he calls "convening power," I call
it "a bunch of guys." Geithner's
world view essentially consists of
getting the finance ministers or
heads of state in a room, developing
an agenda, and then pursuing that
process wherever it takes you. I
think the US has embraced
multilateralism within the G-20 as
an alternative to U.S. leadership. I
think we look at the G-20
differently than does China, Russia,
Brazil and some others. The U.S.
looks at the G-20 as a kind of
benign, kumbaya, kind of global
board of directors that working with
the IMF can bring the world in for a
soft landing. I don't think the
Chinese or the Russians see it that
way. They see the G-20 as an
interesting tool but from a
state-centric view.
Ȯմϴ.
̵ʰ
1990
Ĺݿ
ɷ̶
ֽϴ.
װ
̶
θ ͽϴ.
̵ʰ ᱹ 繫 ѹ濡
ٸ ϰ 鼭 ǥұ?
̱
G-20
ٱ å ̱ ȣϴ ƴѰ մϴ.
̱ ߱,
þ,
,
ٸ
G-20ʹ
ٸ ֽϴ.
̱
G-20
ģϰ ȭ־,
̻
IMF
ַ Ʈ̳ ϴ
.
̳߱ þƴ ȣȣϰ ʴٰ
մϴ.
G-20
߾ .
The IRA: Geithner's
strategy, if you can call it that,
reminds us of the shallow management
pretense visible in many Wall Street
firms. The Chinese and Russians see
themselves in the ascendancy and,
unlike the U.S., these nations have
a vision of where they want to be a
century from now. Americans just
want to borrow more money.
̵
(
θڰ Ѵٸ)
Ʈ 濵 Ͱ ƿ.
̱ ߱ þƴ ڽŵ 켼 ġ ִٴ
100
̷ ֽϴ.
̱ ̳ øϰ .
Rickards: Correct.
The U.S. exit strategy, as seen from
Washington, involves special drawing
rights (SDRs) issued by the IMF.
This brings up Triffin's Dilemma,
which says that the world needs a
global liquidity pump. If there is
not one leading country willing to
run deficits, then global trade
grinds to a halt. The only problem,
thus the dilemma, is that the
deficit nation goes broke.
½ϴ.
̱ ⱸ
IMF
ϴSDR
(Ư)Դϴ.
װ ־ Ѵٴ Ʈ
(ȭ
–
̾ٴ )
ʷմϴ.
ڸ Ÿ 蹫
.
ڸ Եȴٴ ̴ϴ.
The IRA: That would
be us. The conventional view has
always been that the other nations
of the world, seeing their
currencies rise in value as the U.S.
defaults on its debt via inflation,
would eventually inflate their own
money to maintain some type of
parity for trade purposes. What
happens when the U.S. embraces
quantitative easing as part of
normal policy and begins to
explicitly monetize the federal
deficit?
ٸ װ 츮 dz?
δ ̱ ÷̼ ä ϰ
Ǹ ȭġ Ǵµ װ ñ
ϴ ī Ǵ ƴϰڽϱ?
̱
QE
å ϰ ڸ ȭ Ű
˴ϱ?
Rickards: Well we are
not there yet. Where the Treasury
would like to lead us to is the SDR.
Two important things happened in
2009. For the first time in history,
the IMF leveraged its balance sheet.
In the past, the IMF quota system
was essentially equity. The IMF has
obtained binding commitments to
borrow over $500 billion worth of
debt denominated in SDRs. The
greater use of and acceptance of the
SDR is step one and solves Triffin's
dilemma. Then step two, as China
rises, we can dial up the value of
the SDR by including the yuan.
Remember that the SDR is rebalanced
every five years and the yuan is not
currently reflected.
ű ʾҽϴ.
繫ΰ ϴ
SDR
Դϴ.
2009
ΰ ߿ ־ϴ.
ó
IMF
߶Ʈ ߽ϴ.
IMF
Ÿ Ƽϴ.
IMF
SDR
ä500
Ѵ ߽ϴ.
װͿ Ŀ
1
ذå̿ Ʈ Ǯ Դϴ.
2ذå
߱ 鼭
SDR
ԽŰ Դϴ.
SDR
5⸶
ް ˴ϴ.
ݿǰ ʾƿ.
The IRA: So if you
add the Chinese yuan to the SDR, you
devalue the dollar?
SDR
ԵǸ ̴ϱ?
Rickards: Yes. The
dollar buys fewer SDRs. This not
only solves Triffin's dilemma but
also addresses beggar thy neighbor.
We are not going to walk around with
SDRs in our pockets, but this is how
we balance global capital accounts
and rebalance deficit and surplus
countries in the trading system. You
create a new asset against which you
can devalue. But you also create a
new asset which you can print
without accountability to any
democratic process. Nobody elects
the G20 or the IMF.
.
SDR
ۿ ȵǰ ˴ϴ.
Ʈ ذ ÿ Ÿ ߸
ֽϴ.
ٰ 츮 ָӴϿ
SDR
ְ ٴ ϴ.
ں Ű ڿ ڸ Ű
˴ϴ.
ġϰ ο ڻ âϴ ̴ϴ.
ֵ å ʾƵ
Ǵ ڻ ֽϴ.
ƹ
G-20
IMF
ʽϴ.
The IRA: It turns the
IMF into a global clearing house and
central bank. In the post WWII
period, the global ledger was
dollars and gold on one side as
reserve assets and the other
currencies on the other. Now we are
putting the dollar with everyone
else. Does this arrangement result
in fiscal discipline in Washington?
IMF
߾̸鼭 Ŭ Ͽ콺 Ǵ ̳.
2
,
ٸ Ÿ ȭϴ.
ٸ ȭ ʿ ִ ̴ϴ.
ġε ̸ ?
Rickards: No, I think
it just kicks the game upstairs and
down the road. China was a big buyer
of these SDR bonds. They diversified
with minimal market impact. The IMF
took in dollars for their SDR notes
and lent the dollars to Hungary,
Iceland, etc. Thus the IMF not only
levered their balance sheet, but
they also created over a hundred
billion in new SDRs. The IMF
essentially printed money and they
spread them all over the world to
all of the member nations. I see
this as testing the plumbing. Now
the IMF is on standby. The next time
we are in the situation that existed
in 2008, you won't see another $1
trillion stimulus package because we
cannot afford it. Instead you'll see
a trillion SDRs going out the door
suddenly. Remember, when they were
first created in the 1970s SDRs were
called "paper gold."
ƴϿ.
װ
ȿ ᱹ ٽ ƿ
ϴ.
߱
̹
SDR
ä ڿ.
ּȭ ֵ ũ л ҽϴ.
IMF
߱ ŷ,
Ϸ .
IMF
߶Ʈ ߴ ƴ϶
ű
SDR
߾ϴ.
IMF
鿡 ѷ .
װ Ŷ մϴ.
IMF
Ĺϰ ־.
2008
° ٸ
1Ʈ
ڱ ̴ϴ.
̱ ŵ.
SDR 1Ʈ
Ե Դϴ.
ϼ?
70뿡
SDR
̰
ҷ ?
The IRA: Global
quantitative easing? So the old
problem remains, namely supporting
global growth. So here is the
question going back to the EU: If
you are Poland or the Czech
Republic, do you align with NATO and
the Europeans or cut a deal with
Moscow? Does this SDR-based exit
fantasy of Robert Rubin and Tim
Geithner exist alongside the
resurgent euro?
۷ι
QE?
ٸ ִ°ų?
̹ ۷ι ̶ ϻ.
EU
ϴ.
Ǵ ý ȭ̶ Ѵٸ,
ξ ϳ ƴϸ ũٿ
ؾϳ?
̹
SDR
ֹƮ 繫 ̵ 繫 ȯӿ
Żϰ ȰǴ ο Բ ϰ Ǵ ΰ?
Rickards: I think you
already see in formation a
German-Russian axis. Merkel and
Medvedev have been very active in
their discussion. I can't think of
two economies in the world that are
better matched than Germany and
Russia. The former is an export
technological powerhouse, Russia is
a commodity producer and importer of
technology. Russia has a credibility
problem, but combined with the EU
they would become the new
alternative to the dollar.
츰 ̹ -þ
ϰ ֽϴ.
̰ 庣 ־ϴ.
ϰ þ ոŭ ︮ ã ̴ϴ.
ⱹ̸鼭 ĿϿ콺 þƴ
걹̸鼭 ϴ Դϴ.
þƴ ſ ϴ.
EU
ϰ Ǹ ִ
Դϴ.
The IRA: We'll be
watching. Thanks Jim.
Ѻ ϰڽϴ.
ӽ.
